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For new automotive applications and services, information technology (IT) has gained central importance. IT-related costs in car
manufacturing are already high and they will increase dramatically in the future. Yet whereas safety and reliability have become
a relatively well-established field, the protection of vehicular IT systems against systematic manipulation or intrusion has only
recently started to emerge. Nevertheless, IT security is already the base of some vehicular applications such as immobilizers or
digital tachographs. To securely enable future automotive applications and business models, IT security will be one of the central
technologies for the next generation of vehicles. After a state-of-the-art overview of IT security in vehicles, we give a short intro-
duction into cryptographic terminology and functionality. This contribution will then identify the need for automotive IT security
while presenting typical attacks, resulting security objectives, and characteristic constraints within the automotive area. We will
introduce core security technologies and relevant security mechanisms followed by a detailed description of critical vehicular ap-
plications, business models, and components relying on IT security. We conclude our contribution with a detailed statement about
challenges and opportunities for the automotive IT community for embedding IT security in vehicles.
Copyright © 2007 Marko Wolf et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License,
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
Information technology—we broadly define as being systems
based on digital hardware and software—has gained central
importance for many new automotive applications and ser-
vices. The costs for software and electronics are estimated to
approach the 50% margin in car manufacturing in 2015 [1].
Perhaps more importantly, there are estimates that already
today more than 90% of all vehicle innovations are centered
on IT software and hardware [2]. These applications are re-
alized as embedded systems and range from simple control
units to infotainment systems equipped with high-end pro-
cessors whose computing power approaches that of current
PCs. In premium cars, one can find up to 70 processors that
are connected by several bus types and up to several hundred
megabytes of embedded codes.
Not surprisingly, many classical IT and software tech-
nologies are already well established within the automotive
industry, for instance hardware-software codesign, software
engineering, software component reuse, and software safety.
However, one aspect ofmodern IT systems has little attention
in the context of automotive applications: IT security. Secu-
rity is concerned with protection against malicious manipu-
lation of IT systems [3, 4]. The diﬀerence between IT safety
and IT security is depicted in Figure 1. Nevertheless, IT safety
and IT security are interleaved fields, that is, some technical
failure (safety issue) can be used to realize some malicious
threat (security issue) and vice versa.
However, there are today niche applications in the auto-
motive domain (e.g., immobilizers) that particularly rely on
IT security technologies. Nevertheless, the majority of soft-
ware and hardware systems in current cars is not protected
against manipulations. The reason being that past car IT sys-
tems did not need security functions because there was only
little incentive for malicious manipulation. Secondly, secu-
rity tends to be an afterthought in any IT system, because
achieving of the core function is often the main focus when
designing a system. As can be seen for instance by the In-
ternet development, implementing IT security afterwards, is
normally doomed to failure.
The situation has changed dramatically, as we will state in
this contribution with respect to the arguments given above.
More andmore vehicular systems need security functionality
in order to protect the driver, themanufacturer, and the com-
ponent supplier. Secure software update of electronic control
units (ECUs), preventing chip tuning, preventing the unau-
thorized change of the mileage, or assembling nonoriginal
parts are only some examples. Future cars will become even
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Figure 1: The relationship between IT safety and IT security.
more dependent on IT security due to the following develop-
ments.
(i) An increasing number of ECUs will be reprogram-
mable and have to be protected.
(ii) Electronic antitheft measures will go beyond current
immobilizers, for example, by protecting individual
components.
(iii) An increasing number of legislative requirements (e.g.,
secure emergency call functions).
(iv) New business models (e.g., time-limited car functions
or pay-per-use infotainment content) will be estab-
lished.
(v) Vehicles will communicate with the environment in a
wireless fashion that requires protected car-to-infra-
structure communication.
(vi) Increasing networking of cars enables car-to-car com-
munication that has to be protected against abuse and
violation of privacy.
IT security will play an important role for several future
automotive technologies and will even be an enabling tech-
nology for some future applications. The target platforms
within cars that incorporate security functions are embed-
ded systems, rather than classical PC-style computers. Some
obvious diﬀerences in comparison to common PC-based en-
vironments are listed below.
(i) Embedded devices have small processors (often 8-bit
or 16-bit microcontrollers) which are limited with
respect to computational capabilities, memory, and
power consumption. Hence, the usage of crypto-
graphic primitives and protocols is limited.
(ii) Embedded devices mostly have only limited possibil-
ities and limited bandwidth for external communica-
tion. Hence, the extent and frequency of external com-
munication, for example, for internal updates, are lim-
ited.
(iii) Attackers of embedded systems have often physical ac-
cess to the target device itself.
(iv) Embedded systems are often relatively cheap and
cost-sensitive because they often involve high-volume
products. Thus, adding complex and costly security
solutions is not acceptable.
Secure applications
Security mechanisms
Security module(s)
Cryptographic primitives and protocols
Figure 2: Layered security architecture to enable security-critical
vehicular applications based on cryptographic primitives and pro-
tocols.
(v) It is costly to establish the necessary organizational as-
pects for security products, for example, one needs to
adopt the production and life-cycle chain.
Hence, the technologies needed for securing vehicular
applications mainly belong to the field of embedded security
that diﬀers from general IT security.
Outline
The topics discussed in this contribution give a state-of-the-
art overview of IT security in vehicles. We start with an in-
troduction of basic cryptographic functionality in Section 2,
providing the theoretical framework for most security mech-
anisms in cars. We then point out the necessity of vehicu-
lar IT security while presenting attacks and attackers, deduce
relevant security objectives, and indicate characteristic con-
straints within the automotive area in Section 3. As depicted
in Figure 2, we subsequently introduce and explain each es-
sential layer to enable security-critical applications within ve-
hicles. Therefore, we first discuss the necessary security mod-
ule in Section 4, followed by an overview of security mech-
anisms in Section 5 that are based on the security module.
In Section 6, we present various current and future security-
critical vehicular applications that rely on available vehicu-
lar IT security. We conclude our contribution with a detailed
statement about challenges and opportunities for the auto-
motive IT community for embedding IT security in vehicles.
IT security, however, comprises both technical and orga-
nizational measures. IT security systems always include se-
curity relevant organizational processes, and in many cases
an IT security system is compromised due to organizational
weaknesses. To enable secure automotive IT applications,
complex and reliable organizational structures are required.
Thus, organizational security has to be considered individu-
ally and additionally to all technical measures treated in our
contribution.
2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND
Besides security enhancing technologies such as filtering
(e.g., firewalls), anomaly detection (e.g., intrusion detec-
tion systems), or vulnerability scanning (e.g., antivirus soft-
ware), cryptographic primitives for data encryption and de-
cryption, signature generation, and verification including the
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necessary cryptographic protocols are the core of virtually all
security-critical IT systems.
Understanding the basic functionality is essential for de-
signing, analyzing, implementing, and assessing an IT secu-
rity system. In this section, we therefore identify the basic
security services that can be provided by cryptography fol-
lowed by short introductions of symmetric- and public-key
cryptographies, cryptographic hash functions, and crypto-
graphic protocols relevant for vehicular security applications.
2.1. Security properties
Even though security depends on much more than crypto-
graphic algorithms—a robust overall security design includ-
ing secure protocols and organizational measures is needed
as well—cryptographic primitives and schemes are in most
cases the atomic building blocks of a security solution. In
the following, we specify the security properties that prop-
erly combined cryptographic primitives and schemes are re-
quired to enable. Further reading can be found in [5, 6].
(i) Confidentiality (or privacy) is a service ensuring that
information is kept secret from all but authorized par-
ties.
(ii) Integrity is a service ensuring that unauthorized parties
cannot modify system assets and transmitted informa-
tion. Modification includes writing, changing, chang-
ing the status, deleting, and creating the transmitted
messages. It is important to point out that integrity re-
lates to active attacks as well as technical errors, and
therefore it is concerned with detection rather than
prevention. Moreover, integrity can be provided with
or without recovery.
(iii) Authentication (more precisely message origin authen-
tication) is a service concerned with assuring that the
origin of a message is correctly identified. Note that
origin authentication implies integrity; the opposite is
not true.
(iv) Identification (more precisely entity authentication) is
a service establishing the identity of an entity (e.g., a
person, computer, credit card).
(v) Nonrepudiation is a service that prevents the sender of
a message from denying commitments or actions.
(vi) Access control is a service restricting access to resources
to privileged entities.
Security services can be achieved by employing the
two most important cryptographic schemes: symmetric and
asymmetric cryptographies. Symmetric cryptography pro-
vides the ability to securely exchange messages between two
parties. This is especially important if the data should not be
revealed to any third party. Authentication without nonrepu-
diation can also be achieved if the secret key is known only to
the two parties. The second family of schemes, asymmetric
or public-key algorithms, provides advanced functions such
as digital signatures and key distribution over insecure chan-
nels. For common automotive applications, both symmetric-
and public-key algorithms are used.
2.2. Symmetric-key cryptography
Symmetric-key cryptographic algorithms are the basic build-
ing blocks of any secure system that requires at least confi-
dentiality. They are used to encrypt messages in bulk and to
provide secure storage of data. In this kind of cryptographic
algorithms, the keys used for encryption and decryption are
the same for both communicating entities, and hence called
a symmetric cipher. It can be considered as a locked box with
the messages inside that is sent to the other party. If the other
party has the right key to the lock, then the party can open
and read all the messages in the box. The security of the sym-
metric cipher depends on the key (the algorithm is assumed
to be public). The exchange of these keys between the parties
should be done using a secure channel, for example, provided
by a public-key cryptosystem.
Symmetric-key algorithms are mainly divided into two
categories: block ciphers and stream ciphers. Block ciphers en-
crypt the messages in data blocks of fixed length, mostly
64 bits or 128 bits. Most well-known block ciphers are the
data encryption standard (DES) [7], and the advanced en-
cryption standard (AES) [8]. DES was the first commercially
standardized block cipher with 64-bit data block size and 56-
bit key size. The algorithm has been widely used because it
was the only standardized and openly available algorithm ex-
tensively studied by the cryptanalytic community. There have
been no major weaknesses found in the algorithm to date
to practically break it other than the relatively small size of
the key. This allows a brute force attack running through all
the keys. DES finally expired as an US standard in 1999 and
the National Institute of Standards (NIST) selected the Ri-
jndael algorithm as the advanced encryption standard (AES)
in October 2000. In the transition phase, triple-DES was ap-
proved as an FIPS standard [7]. The Rijndael algorithm [9]
developed by Daemen and Rijmen was selected in an open
challenge from a large set of algorithms submitted. AES [8]
supports variable block and key sizes of 128 bits, 192 bits, and
256 bits to give a choice of diﬀerent security levels based on
its application. AES has been optimized for eﬃcient software
and hardware implementations.
Unlike block ciphers, stream ciphers encrypt a plain text
bit by bit. The most famous example is the one-time pad
(OTP) [10] encryption (also called Vernam cipher) which is
the only known cipher which can be proven to be unbreak-
able [11]. The OTP works by bitwise XOR of the plain text
with a one-time key, which is of the same length. The prob-
lem of having a secret key of the same length as the mes-
sage to be transmitted over a secure channel makes OTP en-
cryption inconvenient in practice. This shortcoming is over-
come by using a pseudorandom generator as source for the
secret key (but the unconditional security holds no more).
Today’s stream ciphers operate on a single bit of plain text
(or a few bytes of data) being XORed to a pseudorandom
key stream generated based on a master key and an initializa-
tion vector. Stream ciphers are especially useful in situations
where transmission errors are highly probable because they
do not have error propagation. They can be used when the
data must be processed one symbol at a time because of lack
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of device memory or limited buﬀering. Furthermore, stream
ciphers mostly provide a higher throughput in comparison
with block ciphers.
2.3. Public-key cryptography
The main function of symmetric algorithms is the encryp-
tion of information, often at high speeds. However, there are
two problems with symmetric-key schemes.
(1) It requires secure transmission of a secret key, before
being able to exchange messages.
(2) If in a network environment, each pair of users shares
a diﬀerent key, this will result in many keys.1 Hence,
this fact may result in problems handling the key man-
agement.
(3) After secure reception of a secret key, each party has to
store its key securely for reuse.
The idea behind public-key (PK) cryptography can be vi-
sualized by making a slot into the locked box so that every-
one can deposit a message (like a letter box). However, only
the receiver can unlock the box and read the messages inside.
This concept was first proposed by Diﬃe and Hellman [12]
in 1976.
Public-key cryptography is based on the idea of separat-
ing the key used to encrypt a message from the one used to
decrypt it. Anyone who wants to send a message to another
party, for example, to Bob, can encrypt that message using
Bob’s public key. However, only Bob can decrypt the mes-
sage using his private key. It is understood that the private
key should be kept secret at all times, whereas the public key
is publicly available to everyone. Furthermore, it is impos-
sible for anyone, except Bob, to derive the private key from
the public key (or at least to do so in a reasonable amount of
time).
One can realize three basic mechanisms with public-key
algorithms:
(i) key establishment and key exchange;
(ii) digital signatures;
(iii) data encryption.
In general, one can divide practical public-key algorithms
into three major families.
(i) Algorithms based on the integer factorization problem:
given a positive integer n, it is computationally hard to
find its prime factorization, for example, RSA [13].
(ii) Algorithms based on the discrete logarithm problem
(DLP): given α and β, it is computationally hard to
find x such that β = αx mod p, for example, the Diﬃe-
Hellman key exchange and the digital signature algo-
rithm (DSA).
(iii) Algorithms based on elliptic curves rest upon the DLP
on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over fi-
1 For a network with n users, n · (n− 1)/2 individual keys have to be shared
afore.
nite fields. Elliptic curve cryptosystems [14, 15] are the
most recent family of practical public-key algorithms,
which have gained acceptance including standardiza-
tion [16].
There are many other public-key schemes, such as NTRU
or systems based on hidden field equations, which are not in
widespread use. The scientific community is only at the very
beginning of understanding the security of such algorithms.
Despite the diﬀerences between their underlying mathemat-
ical problems, all three algorithm families have something
in common: they all perform complex operations on very
large numbers, typically 1024–4096 bits in length for the in-
teger factorization and discrete logarithm systems, and 160–
256 bits in length for elliptic curve systems (see also Table 1).
This results in a poor throughput performance in compar-
ison with symmetric ciphers. Nevertheless, public-key algo-
rithms solve the key distribution problem in an elegant way,
since the public part of the key can be distributed via an un-
secured channel. Hence, one can establish a secure link be-
tween two parties without the need for an ulteriorly, pre-
viously exchanged secret. Thus, PK encryption is normally
used for transmitting only small amount of data, like sym-
metric keys (see Section 2.6). Public-key algorithms are not
only used for the exchange of secret keys, but also for the
authentication by using digital signatures. Digital signatures
are analogous to handwritten signatures. They enable com-
munication parties to prove to a third party that one party
has actually generated the message, also called nonrepudia-
tion. The idea of the digital signature is appending a digital
data block to the message that can be generated according
to the message only by the person who signs it (like conven-
tional signatures). Since the digital signature is a function of
the message content and the private key, only the holder of
the private key can sign the corresponding message. In prac-
tical terms, we use the private key for signing (thus only the
holder of the nonpublic private key can sign a document)
and the public key for the verification (thus everyone can ver-
ify the signature using the openly available public key). For
practical implementations, using the RSA algorithm for dig-
ital signatures, a significant smaller public key2 can be chosen
to make the verification of an RSA signature a very fast and
facile operation. Hence, RSA should be used in applications
where the verification is done on the embedded platform and
the signing on a personal computer or server. Instead, ECC
should be used for applications where the embedded device
performs encryption and signature generation as well as de-
cryption and signature verification, since ECC is more eﬃ-
cient considering an application where the embedded device
has to cover the complete public-key functionality.
2.4. Recommended key length
Table 1 puts the public-key and symmetric-key bit lengths in
perspective. This recommendation assumes that in the near
2 However, the private RSA key needs to have full length, for security rea-
sons.
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Table 1: Recommended key length for public-key and symmetric-
key cryptographies.
Security AES/DES ECC RSA
Short-term 64 bits 128 bits 700 bits
Middle-term 80 bits 160 bits 1024 bits
Long-term 128 bits 256 bits 4096 bits
future, there will be no unexpected (mathematical) attacks.
PK systems need much longer keys, because of the attacks
known today, which are more powerful than in the case of
private-key primitives. However, choosing the appropriate
key length depends much on the kind and security targets
of the respective application. Highly security-critical vehic-
ular applications such as digital tachographs, motor control
units, or immobilizers have to provide at least middle-term
security, whereas less security-critical applications such as
personalized presets or customer information services could
apply even short-term security. Although OEMs hardly pro-
vide any public information about applied security stan-
dards, we will provide at least two useful references providing
key length recommendations for flash security [17] and for
wireless car access [18].
2.5. Hash functions
In cryptography, hash functions are used in many applica-
tions, for example digital signatures, pseudorandom number
generators, one-way functions, message authentication codes
(MAC), and others. Hash functions compress a message of
any length to a (nearly) unique string of fixed length, the so-
called hash value or digital fingerprint. Hash functions are
one-way functions, that is, for (almost) all given outputs y, it
is impossible to find any input x such that h(x) = y. Hence,
with a given input, a hash value can be computed, but it is
computationally infeasible to compute the input if only the
hash value is known. A collision-free function is a function
where an attacker cannot find two inputs that compute the
same hash value. Since hash functions map more than one
value to the same hash, a collision cannot be prevented, but
it has to be hard for the attacker to find a collision.
Nowadays, there are several families of hash functions.
TheMD family [19] and SHA family [20] are the ones mostly
used. The MD family generates hash values up to 128 bits
but suﬀer from serious flaws3 making further use of the al-
gorithm for security purposes questionable. The SHA family
was developed by the NSA in 1995 (updated last in 2004) and
generates hash values up to 512 bits. Attacks have been con-
ducted also within the SHA family particularly for the widely
used SHA-1 (160-bit hash value). No attacks have yet been
reported on the higher SHA variants (256 bits and 512 bits),
but since they are similar to SHA-1, researchers are worried,
3 There exist algorithms to find a collision within minutes using a standard
computer.
and are currently developing candidates for a new hashing
standard.
2.6. Cryptographic protocols
Two cryptographic protocols used for many automotive ap-
plications are hybrid encryption and the challenge-response
protocol.
The major disadvantage of public-key primitives, when
compared to symmetric-key schemes, is the arithmetic in-
tensive operations that need to be performed. Hence, this can
lead to a poor system performance. Even when properly im-
plemented, all PK schemes proposed to date are several or-
ders of magnitude slower than the most eﬃcient symmetric-
key schemes. Hence, in practice, cryptographic systems are
applied as a mixture of symmetric-key and public-key cryp-
tosystems in a hybrid fashion. Usually, a public-key algo-
rithm is chosen for key establishment and then a symmetric-
key algorithm is chosen to encrypt the communications,
achieving in this way high throughput rates. As shown in
Figure 3, the sender (Alice) first encrypts a symmetric-key K
with the public key PKBob of the receiver (Bob). Bob then de-
crypts K using his secret private key SKBob. Afterwards, both
proceed their communication using a symmetric cipher with
the previously shared K .
The challenge-response protocol provides entity authen-
tication also called identification, that is, one communica-
tion party identifies itself to a second party. The identifica-
tion can be provided by using knowledge, possession, or in-
dividual properties. The basic idea of the protocol is that one
party challenges the second party, for example, by sending
a random number. The challenged party then has to answer
with the correct response. This correct response can be gen-
erated only if the second party has for instance some kind of
knowledge, for example, the key for a cryptographic prim-
itive. The party can use the key to encrypt the given ran-
dom number and returns it to the challenger, thus proving
the possession of knowledge without revealing it.
Figure 4 presents the challenge-and-response protocol
using a symmetric-key algorithm. However, the protocol can
also be implemented using public-key primitives. In Figure 4,
Alice challenges Bob by sending a random number c. Bob en-
crypts c together with the identity of Alice and returns the
response r. Bob is authenticated once the identity of Alice
and the random number are correctly verified. Note that only
Bob can response to the challenge correctly, since only Bob
possesses the knowledge of the appropriate secret key K .
3. AUTOMOTIVE ATTACKS, SECURITY OBJECTIVES,
AND CHARACTERISTIC CONSTRAINTS
In the following, we first provide an overview of specific
attacks and attackers in the automotive environment that
diﬀer from common PC-based IT systems. We then de-
duce overall automotive security objectives along with the
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Alice Bob
(1) Public-key algorithm:
y = encPKBob (K)
y
K = decSKBob (y)
(2) Symmetric-key algorithm:
z = encK (x)
z
x = decK (z)
Key exchange
(i) Slow, complex
(ii) Low throughput
Data encryption
(i) Fast, eﬃcient
(ii) High throughput
K
PKBob, SKBob
= symmetric session key
= Bob’s public and secret keys
Figure 3: Hybrid encryption protocol.
Alice Bob
(1) Choose random c
c
r
(2) r = encK (c, IDAlice)
(3) c, IDAlice = decK (r)
(4) Verify(c, IDAlice)
K = symmetric key (shared knowledge)
Figure 4: Challenge-response protocol.
characteristic automotive technical and organizational con-
straints.
3.1. Attackers in the automotive area
Today attackers within the automotive area usually either
want to steal a vehicle or a certain valuable component (e.g.,
the navigation system) or—at owner’s disposition—want to
modify certain critical components. These modifications in-
clude for instance manipulation of the mileage for a higher
resale value (reduced mileage) or a higher tax return (in-
creased mileage), manipulation of the motor control unit
(chip tuning) for unauthorized driving parameters, or ma-
nipulations of the tachograph to circumvent legal driving
restrictions or to conceal potential previous infringements.
With future electronic applications (cf. Section 6) such as
electronic license plates, event data recorders, car communi-
cation, and copyrighted infotainment, misuse potentialities
will obviously increase further. Finally, there exist nonneg-
ligible, partially quite extensive, eﬀorts to steal competitors’
expertise and intellectual property in order to advance own
developments or, more likely, to illegally produce marketable
counterfeits.
Since automotive IT systems, in comparison to common
(PC-based) IT systems, imply specific characteristics, attacks
on vehicular IT systems diﬀer from attacks on usual com-
puter systems. Attackers of a computer system seldom have
physical access to the target system, whereas attackers in the
automotive sector mostly have physical access to all built-in
electronics. If there are no further protection measures inte-
grated, attackers can manipulate or replace all built-in com-
ponents. Moreover, afterwards discovered vulnerabilities are
much harder to fix once hundreds and thousands of vehi-
cles are sold already. Finally, automotive attacks are usually
“oﬄine attacks,” where attackers have almost unlimited time
and unlimited trials to succeed.
According to the two diﬀerent attacking objectives—theft
and modification—we identify four diﬀerent groups of at-
tackers as depicted in Table 2. In case of theft, the thief may
have considerable technical expertise and some appropriate
tools. However, a thief usually has only limited physical ac-
cess and limited time. Within the attacking group having
systematic modifications in mind, three typical kinds of at-
tackers can be identified. The first group includes individuals
such as the car owner. They normally have only little techni-
cal expertise, a few appropriate devices, as well as restricted
financial resources for applying an attack. Skilled (OEM)
garage employees are the second group of attackers. They
have appropriate tools, have the necessary technical exper-
tise, and are mostly endued with insider information. They
even would invest money if an attack promises appropriate
revenues, that is, if the attack can be scaled to many auto-
mobiles easily. The third group of attackers includes concur-
rent manufacturers, counterfeiters, and organized crime that
may have immense technical and financial resources limited
only be the potential economic gain. The motivation of this
group is to gain competitors intellectual property (IP) or to
exploit the outcome of an attack commercially, for example,
by selling counterfeits or providing tools and expertise in the
Internet.
Since the group of counterfeiters and organized crime is
the most powerful and dangerous one, all actions to protect
automotive IT should try to resist in particular attacks from
these in such a way that the costs of a successful attack will
exceed the potential gain. More concrete, a single successful
attack on an automotive device must not scale to break also
all other devices, for example, by revealing a global identical
secret.
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Table 2: Attackers in the automotive area.
Target Systematic modification Theft
Attacker Individual, owner Mechanic, garage personnel Organized crime, competitor, faker Thief
Technical resources Varied (Generally low) High Very high Varied
Financial resources Low Medium Very high Low
Physical access Full Full Full Limited
Risk Low Medium Very high Medium
3.2. Automotive attacks
This section provides an overview of specific hardware and
software attacks in the automotive environment that typi-
cally diﬀer from attacks on common PC-based IT systems.
3.2.1. Attacks on automotive hardware
Attacks on automotive hardware comprise attacks to replace
critical components with unauthorized components or to il-
legally modify existing components. Usually, most hardware
components provide, beyond some more or less sophisti-
cated tags, no further protection mechanisms. They can be
easily cloned, modified, or replaced by unauthorized compo-
nents. However, a few critical components such as the tacho-
graph, the speedometer, or airbags provide some basic (cryp-
tographic) mechanisms to prevent or at least to detect unau-
thorized modifications, replacements, or misuse.4 In such
cases, hardware attacks aim at the circumvention or breaking
of these protections by readout of secret keys, deactivation of
alarm channels, or wiretapping their operation or communi-
cation.
3.2.2. Attacks on automotive software
Today’s vehicles hold several dozen electronic control units
(ECU) that control almost anything such as air conditioning,
electric windows, engine, and break system. Several of these
ECUs allow downloading updated program and data code
to apply bug fixes, to improve existing functionality, to re-
new underlying data, or to install/activate new software fea-
tures. The software update might be performed over a diag-
nosis channel, other available communication channels such
as Bluetooth and GSM, or by using a storage medium such
as a CD-ROM or a USB device.
However, present automotive IT systems are mostly un-
protected against malicious software attacks. Often, for ex-
ample, ECUs memory can be accessed without any further
restrictions using their regular interface. Other may be com-
promised employing unprotected diagnosis or communica-
tion interfaces. At last, all ECUs without further measures
for tamper resistance can be dismounted and analyzed of-
fline using sophisticated analysis equipment. Obfuscation
4 Night vision devices for instance, already available for premium class vehi-
cles, are mandatory [21] protected against unauthorized, nonautomotive
usage, for example, as military equipment, by terrorists or guerilla forces.
techniques5 and pure software encryption (without hard-
ware support) provide only minimal additional protection,
since all programs have to be decrypted during runtime, and
hence will be stored and decrypted at one point. The pro-
gram code can then be read out and analyzed by attackers
with only moderate technical understanding. Moreover, en-
cryption keys are mostly stored somewhere unprotected or
can be guessed easily. Disabling even sophisticated software
protection measures by reengineering the “decisive valida-
tion branch” within the binary enables circumvention of al-
most all available software protection mechanisms [22].
Important (software) security vulnerabilities could also
originate from inadequate OEM-internal software protection
management. Thus, employees should not be able to reveal
software to competitors or other unauthorized persons (un-
consciously or maliciously) if adequate organizational secu-
rity precautions are established and executed.
3.3. Overall security objectives
To guarantee road safety and operational reliability of vehi-
cles and to suﬃciently protect business models based on the
security of the vehicular platform, we define the following
overall automotive security objectives.
(i) Confidentiality of data: unauthorized access to pro-
tected data must be infeasible.
(ii) Integrity of data: unauthorized modification of data
must be infeasible or at least detectable.
(iii) Hardware and software integrity: unauthorized modi-
fications to vehicular hardware and software must be
infeasible or at least detectable (by the vehicle).
(iv) Availability: authorized hardware and software com-
ponents must have proper access to their dedicated
data and services.
(v) Uniqueness: unauthorized cloning of a hardware com-
ponents must be infeasible or at least detectable as
nonauthentic.
3.4. Technical constraints
The application of complex IT systems in automotive en-
vironments is subject to some characteristic technical con-
straints.
5 Still used to “protect” for instance mileage information.
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Automotive computing resources are—in comparison to
usual computer systems—rather limited. Nevertheless, auto-
motive applications are often required to provide (hard) real-
time capabilities. This leads to severe requirements on com-
plexity, memory size, and runtime eﬃciency for automotive
implementations that moreover often have to cope with lots
of specific architectural restrictions.
Vehicular IT systems are often subject to specific physi-
cal constraints such as high variations in temperature, mois-
ture, or particular mechanical loads. They have to cope with
these conditions usually over a product life cycle of up to
20 years in which only minimal maintenance eﬀorts are
acceptable.
Moreover, vehicular IT systems usually have only limited
communication resources to, for example, exchange crypto-
graphic keys or updating software. Thus, virtually all vehicu-
lar functionalities have to work properly even with an exter-
nal communication functionality severely limited in capacity
and frequency.
Since typical computer users can mostly employ er-
gonomic input and output devices, users within the automo-
tive environment are restricted to only little ergonomically
designed peripheral devices. To demand only a minimum of
user interactions, virtually all vehicular applications are re-
quired to run almost completely autonomously.
3.5. Nontechnical constraints
Beyond the technical constraints, automotive IT systems are
also subject to some particular organizational and legal con-
straints that may substantially diﬀer from legal constraints
for usual computer systems.
A possible public key and certificates infrastructure (PKI)
for instance requires complex and costly organizational
structures, particularly within the automotive context with
a multitude of involved parties (e.g., manufacturer, supplier,
OEM, garage personnel, content provider, etc.) and only lim-
ited (end-user) security understanding.
Another important key factor is interoperability to exist-
ing infrastructures and devices to enable end-users to inte-
grate their existing devices (e.g., mobile navigation systems,
smart phones, multimedia players, etc.) as simple and holis-
tic as possible.
Since vehicular IT systems—in comparison to, for exam-
ple, usual operating system software—have only limited pos-
sibilities for maintenance, compatibility, stability, safety, and
reliability of deployed hardware and software are obligatory
requirements. In particular, the corresponding support in-
frastructure must be available during the complete typical
life cycle of the vehicle, that is, up to two decades.
Finally, as vehicular IT systems are often involved in
highly safety-critical modules (e.g., steering lock, drive-by-
wire systems), they cannot be released “without any war-
ranty” and “exclusion of any damages” as most PC software
usually does. For providing operating safety and legal secu-
rity, legally binding warranties aremandatory. However, war-
ranty statements can usually only be given based on complex
and expensive internal and external certification procedures
[23]. Thus corresponding documentation, models, tests, and
assessments, as well as the development process itself have to
be prepared for possible certifications already at the begin-
ning of any development process.
4. SECURITYMODULE
security module, which is also called a security anchor, pro-
vides necessary security relevant methods such as encryp-
tion and decryption, generation and verification of signa-
tures, hashing, and secure storage of cryptographic keys.
Such a module might be implemented in software or hard-
ware. Clearly, a hardware solution provides higher perfor-
mance and a far higher security level.6 It is possible to deploy
a single central security module in a vehicle (e.g., at a cen-
tral control unit) or to implement it in each control unit that
has a need for security. In the first case, a hardware imple-
mentation is appropriate to securely protect numerous crit-
ical assets; whereas in the latter case sometimes a software
implementation could be adequate.
A security module must fulfil the following require-
ments.
(i) Unclonable: a securitymodulemust be unclonable. It is
desirable to bind the identity of a vehicle to the security
module in such a way that it can neither be faked, or
manipulated, nor cloned. In addition, it must be im-
possible to install the security module in another car
in order to change its identity.
(ii) Secure key storage: a security module must be able to
store keys in a secret and protected way. It must protect
secret keys from being read and public keys from being
altered.
(iii) Secure computations: the security module must be able
to securely (and eﬃciently) perform cryptographic op-
erations to prevent leakage of cryptographic secrets
into unprotected areas.
(iv) Alarm channel: in case of a security breach, the security
module must be able to give notice. For instance, such
an alarm channel might be provided at diagnosis.
A security module can be based on a customized security
controller, a trusted platform module (TPM), or an FPGA. A
TPMprovides a compatible standard interfacemore suited to
the PC oﬃce world, whereas a customized security controller
approach can be adapted in a flexible way. Both approaches
provide a highly secure computing environment as well as
secure key storage. An approach based on FPGAs provides a
very flexible way at higher cost. Table 3 summarizes the assets
and drawbacks of diﬀerent hardware solutions.
Using a security module purely based on software, run-
time attacks exploiting available software interfaces can be
usually avoided, if an implementation as small as possible
6 Note that pure software security mechanisms can often be broken very
easily [22], and thus provide only little protection of the corresponding
control unit.
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Table 3: Hardware security module.
Trusted platform module (TPM) Customized security controller Field-programmable gate array (FPGA)
Standardized Yes No No
Flexibility Very limited Yes, until release Yes, even after release
Cost Medium Low (high volumes) High
Security level High Adaptable Medium-high
and secure7 is used. Runtime or online attacks are limited
to use given software interfaces and, for instance, try to inject
malicious code. However, hardware modifications based on
manipulation, exchange, and addition of hardware compo-
nents probing communication lines cannot be prevented (or
even detected) by pure software security modules. Applying
solutions based on a hardware security module and plausi-
bility checks, most attacks can be at least detected.8 Hence,
the main achievements of a security module are as follows.
(i) A single security module might save code size, and
hence even cost.
(ii) A solution based on a software security module is able
to prevent at least runtime software attacks (such as
injecting malicious code).
(iii) A solution based on a hardware security module is able
to prevent software attacks and detect hardware-based
attacks (such as hardware manipulation).
5. SECURITYMECHANISMS
In the following, we present mechanisms based on crypto-
graphic methods and the security module that enable secur-
ing components and business models described in the subse-
quent section. We start by presenting mechanisms to ensure
hardware and software integrities as well as to secure com-
munication channels.
5.1. Hardware protection
A facile way of providing a basic protection against hardware
manipulations can be achieved by mechanical countermea-
sures deploying special component constructions. Such spe-
cial constructions could be proprietary constructions that fit
only into cars of a single manufacturer or constructions that
require proprietary (not publicly available) tools and equip-
ment. However, that solution is uncomfortably and provides
only minimal hardware security.
More reliable approaches [24] for detection of faked or
bogus vehicle components use small computing tags attached
7 The ideal case would be a software security module that could be verified
formally.
8 Assuming suﬃcient time and money, even hardware attacks cannot be
prevented at reasonable cost in a vehicle. Thus, a single successful attack
on a security module must not scale to also break all other security mod-
ules.
to each crucial component in order to logically bind security
and safety related parts to a specially protected central secu-
rity module. Such component identification schemes rely on
the tamper-evidence of the computing tags that are tightly
(nonremovable) integrated into critical components that can
communicate with each other and on the tamper resistance
of the central security module. The component identification
protocol works even without the need of a central tamper
resistance security module by distributing its task to the, of
course more powerful, computing tags.
To protect hardware (and particularly hardware IP) eﬀec-
tively, all critical hardware cores have to be integrated com-
pletely into a single protected chip. Although there are (phys-
ical and chemical) methods to comprise even such a system
on a chip (SoC), these are highly sophisticated and expensive
methods. Thus, today attacks on SoC hardware can comprise
only small amount of data and are not applicable to large
amount of hardware. However, if the outcome is worthwhile
enough, for example, if an SoC contains a globally similar
secret key that easily enables fraudulent manipulation on a
large scale, even sophisticated and expensive attacks are fea-
sible.
5.2. Software protection
In order to provide eﬀective software protection,
(1) only original software must be accepted by the vehicle:
no manipulated or malicious software must be down-
loaded to the car. In particular, no software must be
successfully downloaded to the ECU that alters the de-
fined behavior of the vehicle (e.g., due to software ver-
sion conflicts);
(2) only authenticated parties are able to alter data, for ex-
ample, parameters, stored in the vehicle.
Furthermore, the following is desired for an actual secu-
rity design:
(i) the compromise of a single control unit does not aﬀect
the entire system, that is, a successful attack does not
scale;
(ii) the required computational performance on the side
of the control unit will be minimal.
A solution for this problem in general is quite simple.
Based on digital signatures, the issuer of the software signs
the program code and the control unit in the vehicle verifies
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Table 4: RSA signature verification on ARM7TDMI at 40MHz.
Code size Time
SHA-1 hashing 1132 680 kB/s
RSA exponentiation
2368 11ms
w/small public key
RSA verification
3500 34ms
(16 kB code)
Software
development
Program
code
Digital
signature
Database
Trust center
Secret
key
Trustworthy
PC
Device
Public key
1
2
3
4
5
6
Figure 5: Secure software download.
it. Hence, the issuer holds a secret key for signing the pro-
gram code and the control units hold the corresponding pub-
lic key for verifying it. This is depictured in Figure 5 in more
detail. First, the software is developed. Once it is finished
(Step 1), the program object code is passed to a trust cen-
ter (Step 2) that signs the object code using its secret key. The
signature is then passed back and attached to the program
object code (Step 3). The package of code and signature is
now stored in a database (Step 4) that might hold versions
for diﬀerent control units. Finally, the appropriate program
code is downloaded to a control unit (Step 5) and verified by
means of the public key stored in the ECU (Step 6).
One can see that security objective (1) is clearly fulfilled:
Only a legitimate authority can issue an appropriate signa-
ture for program code that will be accepted by the vehicle,
that is, only authentic software will be accepted by the ve-
hicle. Most of today’s cars already provide a mechanism for
downloading software. Hence, only a mechanism for verify-
ing the signature is additionally needed in the vehicle. For
signature verification, RSA is an appropriate fit since it allows
very fast signature verification. This can be implemented in
software. Some performance values of our implementation
are displayed in Table 4. Note that for the signature verifica-
tion, first the program code needs to be hashed and then an
RSA exponentiation is performed. The last column displays
the overall time for the signature verification at the example
of 16 kB of program code, which is a typical size for a vehicle
control unit.
On the server side, the key management and the orga-
nizational security must be thoroughly organized. Latter as-
pect includes organization of who has access to sign pro-
gram code and how the process of signing is performed and
recorded. However, there is no full-sized public-key infras-
tructure (PKI) necessary. It is suﬃcient to issue a single pri-
vate/public key pair such that the private key is stored in the
trust center and the public key in the control unit. The trust
center might simply be a PC that is disconnected from any
computer network and a secure smart card that holds the
secret key. If a finer-grained approach is desired, a key pair
for each control unit type, for each production year, or each
production locationmight be applied. No certificates that in-
duce overhead are required, though. The ECU only needs to
store a public key such that no secret information is stored
here. However, this public key must be protected from ma-
nipulation. Otherwise, an adversary could replace this key in
the ECU and then induce any manipulated software.
Security objective (2) can be fulfilled by a simple chal-
lenge-and-response mechanism as presented in Sec-
tion 2.6. The vehicle and an external party (e.g., a standard
PC) share a secret key. The parties then run a challenge-
response scheme in order to prove that the external party
knows the secret key. After a successful run, the external
party can access the vehicle’s data. However, it is crucial
that a well-defined interface is specified. For instance, it
is reasonable to protocol all changes in a log file and give
access only to nonsafety critical data. Using a symmetric-key
management is reasonable—each ECU knows an individual
symmetric secret key shared with the third party. This third
party might be the car manufacturer storing all keys in a
protected database.
Protecting the key of the ECU is crucial. If an adversary
is able to read out or replace the key, he might be able to ma-
nipulate program or data code. Thus, virtual software pro-
tection can be achieved only by applying hardware-assisted
approaches employing a security module as described in
Section 4.
Nevertheless, there also exist mechanisms that try to
complicate utilization or at least try to help identifying the
origin in case a software could be successfully read out by an
attacker. In order to make decompiling and reengineering of
program binaries more diﬃcult, programs known as “obfus-
cators” convert source code, object code, or both, into ob-
fuscated code, making the result overcomplicated, and thus
far less readable and almost impossible to understand by a
human being. However, obfuscation [19, 25] only increases
the diﬃculty for reverse engineering, limits portability, and
is regarded as “security through obscurity.” Digital water-
marking [26] or fingerprinting are techniques which embed
(visible or invisible) information into a digital content (soft-
ware or data) that cannot or only hardly can be removed
or modified. Original owners then can use tools to extract
the embedded information to detect, for example, the ori-
gin of an illegitimate copy or tampering. However, these al-
ready exist technologies to abolish respective restrictions for
both mechanisms. Thus, such mechanisms cannot replace a
proper hardware-based software protection.
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5.3. Secure communication
Until now, vehicles did communicate to the outside world
only rarely. The communication channels were mainly pro-
vided for diagnosis purposes by proprietary methods. Now
mobile devices, in particular cell phones, are connected to
the vehicle’s systems by a cradle and recently also by a wireless
Bluetooth channel. The software download described above
can also be seen as a communication channel. The vehicle
manufacturers start to open more and more communication
channels to the car such that vehicles are about to become
more open. Hence, sophisticated strategies for secure com-
munication are necessary. There are diﬀerent general com-
munication facets to consider here.
(i) In-vehicle communication: communication inside of a
vehicle, for example, to link a mobile device to the ve-
hicle’s head unit or to allow communication between
head unit and anti-lock braking system (ABS).
(ii) Vehicle-to-vehicle communication: communication be-
tween vehicles, for example, to exchange data about
road conditions or traﬃc jams.
(iii) Vehicle-to-infrastructure communication: communica-
tion between vehicles and the infrastructure. For in-
stance, sensors embedded in the road report icy streets
and traﬃc lights forward their light phase.
The vehicle-to-vehicle as well as vehicle-to-infrastructure
communications make possible a variety of new fascinat-
ing scenarios. For instance, cars communicate to each other
in order to transmit information about imminent dangers
(traﬃc jams, accidents, or sudden weather changes), traﬃc
controls, or free parking spaces. In addition, it would be pos-
sible to group together cars on a highway and make driving
more comfortable and safe. Digital contents such as multi-
media files could be downloaded to a car when connected to
the Internet (e.g., at a gas station) and navigation data could
be updated at the same time. The license plate can be replaced
by an electronic license plate that transmits the license num-
ber such that it can be used for various purposes, for exam-
ple, wireless payments or automatic gateway access control.
There are various requirements to implement such sce-
narios. These comprise both technical and organizational as-
pects as follows.
(i) Message integrity: alteredmessages must be detected by
the vehicle.
(ii) Message authenticity: origin of a message from a valid
source must be verifiable by the vehicle.
(iii) Privacy: vehicles must not endanger privacy of the
driver and owner. For instance, a GPS receiver or an
electronic plate must not be used to track a car. On the
other side, it is often desirable to allow authorities to
access this data in a well-defined way.
(iv) Eﬃciency: if cryptographic algorithms are involved,
these must often run extremely fast to allow real-time
behavior. For instance, a warning message about an
imminent danger must be processed immediately.
Secure communication is mainly based on encryption
and authentication in order to provide confidentiality and
authenticity of exchanged data. While authentication is nec-
essary in most scenarios in order to make sure that there
are no malicious messages induced to the network, con-
fidentiality might often be less important. For instance, a
warning message should be authentic but not confiden-
tial. Clearly, a vehicle should implement a balanced secu-
rity policy in such a way that it reacts in a reasonable way
based on external input, internal input (such as internal sen-
sors), and most important the drivers decision. Based on
the external infrastructure, protocols that are more sophisti-
cated can be implemented. For instance, location-based pro-
tocols [27] as well as time-based protocols can be imple-
mented.
There is a variety of literature available about secure
communication. See [28] for in-vehicle communication and
[27] for car-to-car and for car-to infrastructure communi-
cations. Furthermore, there are a variety of standardizations
and on going projects dealing with such topic such as Car-2-
Car Communication Consortium [29], Network on Wheels
(NOW) [30], CIVS [31], SAFESOPT [32], and IEEE 1609.2
[18].
6. SECURITY-CRITICAL VEHICULAR APPLICATIONS
Several vehicular applications provide security features or
are security relevant. These applications are usually based
on a security module and security mechanisms as de-
scribed before. In order to properly realize such a security-
critical vehicular application the following steps have to be
done:
(1) analysis of valuable attacking targets and all relevant
attackers to create the corresponding attacker model
(cf. Section 3.2);
(2) establishing the corresponding security objectives (cf.
Section 3.3);
(3) design of a proper security module(s) capable to suc-
cessfully fend oﬀ the attacker model and fulfill the se-
curity objectives derived before (cf. Section 4);
(4) implementation of the required security mechanisms,
based on the afore-designed security module(s), the
security-critical application builds on (cf. Section 5).
We would like to point out that once a security module
and the corresponding security mechanisms have been im-
plemented properly, this base can be easily reused to protect
also other future security-critical applications9 with almost
no additional cost.
In the following, we give an overview about current
and future security-critical vehicular applications that can be
protected in this way.
9 Provided that the added application has the same attacker model.
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Challenge r
Response f (r, k)
Figure 6: Electronic immobilizer.
6.1. Electronic immobilizer
The electronic immobilizers as well as the keyless entry to a
vehicle are probably the oldest applications of cryptography
in vehicles. The electronic immobilizer usually works in the
following way. The vehicle sends a challenge to a passive bat-
teryless transponder integrated in the vehicle key, which then
answers by a response. Transponder and vehicle share a secret
key. Only if the transponder knows the secret key, then the
vehicle will start. Hence, a vehicle’s key that has the appropri-
ate physical properties (i.e., that is an exact physical copy of
the original key) but does not know the secret cryptographic
key will not make the vehicle starting. This is depictured in
Figure 6. Here, f is a cryptographic function such as a keyed
hash function that takes as input the challenge r as well as
a key k and returns the response. A general approach for an
electronic immobilizer was presented in [33].
For the electronic immobilizer, attacks at the hardware
layer must be considered. Such a hardware attack can never
be prevented at reasonable cost. The goal is to make such an
attack impossible for a rational attacker, that is, the cost of
an attack will exceed the gain of the stolen car on the black
market. Hence, the goal is to achieve an economic security.
A hardware security module is an appropriate platform to
provide such security goals. It is able to securely store the
secret keys and to bind the key’s transponder to the vehicle
by means of the security module. The immobilizer binds a
crucial control unit (usually the engine control unit) to the
vehicle’s key. Hence, the engine control unit is only activated
if the proper key is presented. There are several weaknesses
though. The crucial control unit can simply be replaced by
one that is always activated, that is, by one that implements
exactly the same functions but without the key verification.
Hence, avoiding malicious software updates of the firmware
is absolutely necessary. Furthermore, a so-called Mafia at-
tack is possible. Here, the vehicle’s signal is forwarded over
an external channel (say, a wireless LAN) to the vehicle’s key.
This is in particular dangerous in combination with a key-
less entry system where an adversary establishes a channel
between the victim’s vehicle and the victim such that the ve-
hicle’s doors unlock and the engine starts. Usually, once the
vehicle starts, the engine will not turn oﬀ even if the key’s
signal is lost.
The later attack can hardly be avoided on a cryptographic
layer. A countermeasure is to use the so-called distance
bounding (see, e.g., [34]). Here, the protocol can make sure
that the vehicle’s key is inside of a well-defined geographi-
cal area. However, due to timing problems and wavelength of
the transponder, this might be too imprecise. Further coun-
termeasures can be provided on the physical level. For in-
f (i, k)
Figure 7: Remote key.
stance, multifrequency hopping is already applied today for
such. Clearly, each electronic immobilizer can be compro-
mised. However, the objective is not to set up a perfectly se-
cure system, but an economical secure system—breaking a
single vehicle should be more expensive than the gain of the
attacker.
6.2. Keyless entry
The remote key entry works in a similar way as the electronic
immobilizer. Here the key is equipped with an active battery-
powered transponder. When pushing the button of the ve-
hicle’s remote control key, the vehicle will unlock the doors.
Therefore, the so-called rolling codes are used. Both vehicle
and key share a secret. Each time the key’s button is pushed,
a new secret is derived by the key and sent to the vehicle. The
vehicle can compute the same transition and compare the
two values. If they are equal, the vehicle unlocks its doors.
Certainly, the key’s button might be pushed several times.
The vehicle then repeatedly computes the internal value and
compares it. It repeats this, say, a hundred times before giv-
ing up. This is shown in Figure 7. The remote control as well
as the car hold a counter i that is increased by one after each
application.
Modern cars are equipped with a keyless entry system.
Here, the driver carries a key-card in his pocket. Once he
approaches the vehicle, the doors are unlocked. This system
usually works as follows. The protocol starts when the door
handle is touched. The vehicle then transmits a signal. Once
the key card approaches the car, it will be detected by the
vehicle and then responds to the car. Then a cryptographic
challenge-response method is carried out. Note that the key
card usually is comparable to a passive or battery-powered
radio frequency identification (RFID) tag.
Attacks on the remote key entry and keyless entry system
are located at the protocol and physical transmission layers.
An attacker might try to compromise the secret key or to re-
play a message in such a way that it unlocks the doors. How-
ever, it can be assumed that there is no physical breach—
an adversary could otherwise just smash a window. Hence,
such systems can be designed in a secure way using tradi-
tional cryptographic schemes. However, attacks on the physi-
cal transmission layer such as theMafia attack have to be con-
sidered carefully since they are inherent for any such scheme
and can hardly be prevented by cryptographic means.
6.3. Digital tachograph and event data recorder
Digital tachographs and the so-called event data record-
ers are a well-considered security relevant component in
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vehicles. Manipulation of tachographs has a serious safety
and economic impact. Today, it is assumed that about a third
of all used cars was manipulated regarding the tachograph
counter, for example, in order to achieve higher prizes on the
used markets. In the case of trucks, the attacker usually is the
truck driver or the owner, who tries to circumvent rest pe-
riods, speed limits, and law regulations. However, recently
several law regulations were introduced to stop such mis-
behavior. For truck tachographs, there was a European law
introduced [35] concerning the required security level ac-
cording to the ITSEC security standard and specification of
the involved processes. This leads to several security certified
truck tachographs. Furthermore, for vehicles in Germany, a
law was introduced making any change of the tachograph
counter liable to penalty.
The attacker of this system is usually the owner (com-
pany) or the driver of the vehicle. Hence, he has full physical
access to any component and unlimited time for an attack.
An attack on the hardware level is usually performed and the
goal is to achieve an economic gain. For standard personal
vehicles, it is almost impossible to prevent a manipulation at
reasonable cost, whereas for high-cost trucks it is possible up
to a certain point. In both cases, the first objective is to detect
a manipulation though. Hence, some kind of security mod-
ule is required. This might even involve a security controller
such as a smart card controller as described by the European
law regulation for truck tachographs.
Each truck is equipped with a motion sensor that receives
input of the gearbox and transmits signals to the tachograph
on an encrypted channel. The main objective is to record
the truck drivers’ behavior and working hours. The Euro-
pean law enforces that every truck driver uses a personal-
ized smart card when driving the truck by inserting it to the
digital tachograph. Clearly, privacy is a crucial aspect here.
Hence, there are four kinds of smart cards provided. Besides
the truck driver’s card, there is a card for each company that
owns trucks, for workshops that maintain the trucks, as well
as for police authority. The smart cards are issued with keys
that are organized by European wide key management hier-
archy.
The security of the system can only be provided by a com-
bination of technical and organizational means. For instance,
it is possible to manipulate the gearbox such that the mo-
tion sensor receives false input. Therefore, integrity of the
motion sensor and the gearbox must regularly be verified by
police authorities. Once again, attacks that manipulate hard-
ware components cannot be avoided by technical means, but
they can be detected by a combination of technical and orga-
nizational means.
6.4. Counterfeit and expertise protection
Today, large amounts of OEM’s capital investments are spent
on software and electronic development [1] that—without
further protection—can be simply copied, analyzed, and
reused by simply buying the corresponding components or
vehicles. Thus, reliable counterfeit and intellectual property
(IP) protection should prevent copyright infringement or ex-
pertise theft by potential competitors and particularly to pre-
vent mass production of unauthorized counterfeits of vehicle
components.
(i) Counterfeit protection: illegal produced replacement
parts cause a worldwide loss of about 3 billion dollars
[36] permonth. The professional organizedmanipula-
tion of automotive electronics [37] causes considerable
damage to the manufacturers and to the economics
by unwarranted claims, brand damage, and under-
mined businessmodels.Moreover, counterfeits endan-
ger the safety of all motorists and cyclists. Traditional
methods to prevent counterfeits use tags, for example,
holographic stickers that are supposed to be unforge-
able. However, there exist illegal businesses that cre-
ate boxes, labels, and other significant trademark lo-
gos and emblems to let counterfeits look like real parts
[38].
(ii) IP and Expertise protection: automotive OEMs and
suppliers always have a comprehensible interest to
find out valuable expertise from their potential com-
petitors. Moreover, even though intellectual property
rights are legally eﬀective in most countries in the
world, there exist large domestic markets, such as
China, where IP thefts and infringements are virtually
nontriable. Therefore, expertise leakage and IP theft
are a serious problem. Today mostly for software and
firmware, but even complex hardware, can be copied
when it is profitable enough. Expertise leakage and IP
theft have to be tackled primarily applying organiza-
tional security measures such as scrutinizing poten-
tial partners and preventing employees from uninten-
tional (or intentional) exposures. However, there exist
also (cryptographic) technologies that can help pro-
tecting IP and expertise or making a theft or leakage at
least detectable.
6.5. After-sale business applications
Embedding security in vehicles enables various new and in-
teresting business models previously not possible. Particu-
larly, it enables business models where all involved parties
(OEMs, suppliers, and customers) can benefit from. In the
following, we present three exemplary business models made
possible by progress in vehicular security.
6.5.1. Feature activation
The production of vehicular components moves from vari-
ous small charges of diﬀerent individually adjusted compo-
nents towards large-scale production of only a small number
of uniform standard components. Thus, today many of the
various vehicle versions internally consist mostly of the same
components. On the other hand, providing manifold indi-
vidual vehicle configurations is crucial even now. To solve
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this opposing requirements, car manufacturer could build
parts identical in construction cost-eﬃciently with most fea-
tures already built-in, but individually activated. Moreover,
it is possible to individually activate (or deactivate) built-
in hardware components or software after sales for an ad-
ditional charge that would furthermore bind the customer
long term to the OEM. Features that would be capable for
after-market activation could be, for instance, special setups
for engine, gear or chassis control, enhanced board com-
puter and comfort diagnosis functions, additional driving as-
sistance and infotainment capabilities, or certain personal-
ization and individualization features. However, capable se-
curity measures are required to prevent unauthorized fea-
ture activation that may undermine the underlying business
model.
6.5.2. Infotainment
Maybe the most exciting new applications in the automotive
are driven by new infotainment business models distribut-
ing digital content. The area ranges from individual soft-
ware upgrade packages, OEM premium content, newscasts
up to various multimedia files including music, video, or
games. Today, already most medium-sized cars are equipped
with multimedia capable on-board computers and radio sys-
tems. Upcoming integrated wireless broadband communi-
cation promises a brisk market for automotive-related on-
demand sales. Embedding a reliable digital rights manage-
ment (DRM) enables business models for usage-metered and
on-demand utilization of digital contents, software, and even
hardware beyond the classical lump-sum model. Some pos-
sible examples are provided below.
(i) Time-limited utilization: up-to-date navigation and
traﬃc data may be available on demand for any place
in the world (e.g., only for a two-week vacation trip in
the respective area).
(ii) Quantity-limited utilization: movies, music tracks, or
games can be bought for an n-times repeated utiliza-
tion.
(iii) Device-bound utilization: extra software can be in-
stalled on a particular device or a particular vehicle
only. Certain car functions are performed only via a
certain authentication device such as a driver’s key,
dealer token, or personal cellular.
(iv) Usage-metered utilization: navigation routes can be
charged for their actually used length. Movies or music
tracks can be charged for the actual viewing time.
(v) Subscription services: audio, video, or information
broadcast services can be received as long as a valid
subscription to the corresponding service exists.
Furthermore, almost arbitrary combinations are possi-
ble. For instance, an afterwards activated enhanced comfort
sensor (e.g., tire air pressure sensor) may be enabled as free
sample for 4 weeks. Business models using digital content
that has usage or access restrictions are only possible with
a secure and reliably implemented DRM system. As it could
be seen in various (nonautomotive) DRM scenarios such as
pay-TV, online music stores, or video game consoles, hav-
ing no such secure module, the business model will certainly
fail.
6.6. Location-based services
Oﬀering services based on the vehicle’s current location pro-
vided by a built-in GPS or GSM receiver together with a wire-
less communication device enables various safety, manage-
ment, and business applications.
(i) Automatic emergency call (eCall): the first popular
location-based service would probably be the auto-
matic emergency call, mandatory for all new vehicles
within the EuropeanUnion from 2009. As proposed by
the eCall Driving Group [39], in case of emergency the
eCall system establishes a voice connection directly to
a call center initiated either manually by vehicle occu-
pants or automatically via activation of in-vehicle sen-
sors. At the same time, actual location, available inci-
dent, or medical data will be sent to the eCall opera-
tor receiving the voice call. To address privacy issues
and prevent potential misuse, an eCall system requires
mechanisms for secure authorization and confidential
transmission.
(ii) Location-based information: location-based informa-
tion services might for example allow the driver to find
the nearest business of a certain type, for example, the
next fuelling station, the next ATM, or accommoda-
tions and restaurants available in the immediate vicin-
ity. Optionally, the driver might allow certain location-
based incoming information such as traﬃc news, local
objects of interest, or localized advertisements. To pre-
vent potential misuse, we need a secure authentication
and authorization for all incoming messages. Outgo-
ing queries, however, require adequate protection of
the driver’s privacy.
(iii) Location-based billing: having the current vehicle po-
sition would also enable certain automatic vehicular
billing applications, for example, for toll roads or park-
ing. Then drivers could securely pay by a simple ac-
knowledgment within their car while the operating
company or authority would not need to maintain an
expensive billing infrastructure. This scenario, how-
ever, again needs eﬃcient and reliable cryptographic
mechanisms to mutually ensure payments while pro-
tecting the driver’s privacy. Furthermore, only secure
positioning could reliably enable advanced applica-
tions such as restricted areas of operation or upcoming
pay-as-you-drive insurances.
(iv) Fleet management: modern fleet management systems
enable, in addition to vehicle tracking, advanced func-
tionality such as centrally managed routing and ef-
ficient dispatch, driver authentication, remote diag-
nosis while gathering details on current driver’s sta-
tus, mileage, fuel consumption, or container status.
Therefore, a fleet management system demands for
mechanisms to establish secure connections to the
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vehicle’s onboard computer and requires appropriate
mechanisms to provide in-vehicle driver authentica-
tion and authorization.
6.7. Legal authority support
Support for various vehicular legal authority applications
could become a crucial impulse for automotive electronics.
Since oﬃcial applications very often involve sensitive per-
sonal information, they often demand appropriate IT secu-
rity measures to become enabled. In the following, some fea-
sible applications for legal authority support in the automo-
tive area are listed.
(i) Electronic road signs: there already exist developments
[40] for dashboards with integrated traﬃc sign recog-
nition systems that will warn the driver whether he is
driving too fast. Since present traﬃc sign recognition
systems still process digital images of their environ-
ment, future approaches will also integrate electronic
road signs that wirelessly transmit their (variable) in-
formation about actual speed limits, road works, traf-
fic jams, or road conditions. However, to detect bogus
or faked information, the vehicle requires an appropri-
ate IT security architecture to reliably verify incoming
traﬃc sign information for validity.
(ii) Electronic license plate: integrating a wireless transpon-
der into a vehicle that broadcasts an (unique) identi-
fication string will be another promising automotive
development. Such an electronic license plate could for
instance help to easily implement tolling and payment
systems, or particularly help police forces and public
authorities to identity a vehicle in case of accident or
law violation. However, an adversary could modify or
just steal an electronic license plate for misinforma-
tion or impersonation. Drivers in turn, require that
toll road stations or an arbitrary road user cannot ac-
quire the same amount of information as for instance
qualified police forces. Thus, the application of elec-
tronic license obviously requires an adequate vehicu-
lar IT security architecture that regards attackers from
both outside and inside.
(iii) Electronic log books: providing evidence for accom-
plished trips or critical maintenance operations can
be very important for legal restraints, commuting ac-
counts, or warranty claims. Having an integrated elec-
tronic service check book and/or driver’s log would
clearly ease bookkeeping and provide reliable infor-
mation. However, both demand appropriate manipu-
lation and privacy protection.
7. CONCLUSION: CHALLENGES ANDOPPORTUNITIES
FOR THE AUTOMOTIVE IT COMMUNITY
In this contribution, we presented a state-of-the-art overview
of IT security in vehicles. After a short introduction to
cryptographic terminology and functionality, we identified
the need for automotive IT security while presenting the spe-
cific attackers and attacks within the automotive area. We
introduced core security technologies and relevant security
mechanisms required to protect current and future vehicular
applications, business models, and components that rely on
IT security. In summary, it can be stated that embedding IT
security in vehicles.
(1) protects against manipulations by outsiders, owners,
and maintenance personnel;
(2) increases the safety and reliability of a vehicular sys-
tem;
(3) enables new IT-based automotive applications and
business models.
As sketched above, there are several diﬃculties to over-
come in order to develop strong embedded security solu-
tions. We would like to give an outlook on the future of IT
security in cars in the form of the following recommenda-
tions and conclusions.
(i) IT security will be a necessary requirement for many
future automotive applications.
(ii) IT security will allow a multitude of new IT-based
business models, for example, location-based services
or fee-based flashing. For such systems, security will be
an enabling technology.
(iii) IT security will be integrated invisibly in embedded
devices. Embedded security technologies will be a field
in which manufacturers and part suppliers need to de-
velop expertise.
(iv) IT security solutions have to be designed extremely
carefully. A single “minor” flaw in the system design
can render the entire solution insecure. This is quite
diﬀerent from engineering most other technical sys-
tems: a single nonoptimum component usually does
not invalidate the entire system. An example is the con-
tent scrambling system (CSS) for DVD content pro-
tection, which was broken easily once it was reverse-
engineered.
(v) Embedded security in vehicles has to deal with very
specific boundary conditions: computationally and
memory-constrained processors, tight cost require-
ments, and physical security.
(vi) The multitier manufacturing chain for modern vehi-
cles (OEM and possibly several layers of suppliers)
can have implications for the security design. It is, for
instance, relevant who designs a security architecture
and, most importantly, who has control over the cryp-
tographic keys.
(vii) Merging the automotive IT and the embedded security
community will allow many new applications. How-
ever, there are also several challenges: security and
cryptography have historically been a field dominated
by theoreticians, whereas the automotive IT is usually
done by engineers. The culture in those two commu-
nities is quite diﬀerent at times, and both sides have
to put eﬀort into understanding each other’s way of
thinking and communicating.
16 EURASIP Journal on Embedded Systems
REFERENCES
[1] A. Saad and U. Weinmann, “Automotive software engineer-
ing and concepts,” in GI Jahrestagung, pp. 318–319, Frankfurt,
Germany, September-October 2003.
[2] E. Nickel, “IBM automotive software foundry,” in Press Con-
ference on Computer Science in Automotive Industry, Frankfurt
University, Frankfurt, Germany, September 2003.
[3] ISO/IEC, “Information technology—guidelines for the man-
agement of IT security—part 1: concepts and models for IT
security,” Tech. Rep. TR 13335-1, ISO/IEC, Genf, Switzerland,
1996.
[4] R. Shirley, “Internet security glossary,” Tech. Rep. RFC 2828,
GTE/BBN Technologies, Cambridge, Mass, USA, May 2000,
http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2828.txt.
[5] M. Bishop, Computer Security: Art and Science, Addison-
Wesley, Reading, Mass, USA, 2003.
[6] W. Stallings, Cryptography and Network Security, Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliﬀs, NJ, USA, 4th edition, 2005.
[7] National Institute of Standards & Technology, “FIPS-46-3:
Data Encryption Standard (DES),” October 1977, reaﬃrmed
in October 1999.
[8] National Institute of Standards & Technology, “FIPS-197:
Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),”
November 2001.
[9] J. Daemen and V. Rijmen, “AES proposal: rijndael,” in Proceed-
ings of the 1st Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Candidate
Conference, Ventura, Calif, USA, August 1998.
[10] G. S. Vernam, “Cipher printing telegraph systems for secret
wire and radio telegraphic communications,” Journal of the
American Institute of Electrical Engineers, vol. 55, pp. 109–115,
1926.
[11] C. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” The
Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 656–715, 1949.
[12] W. Diﬃe and M. E. Hellman, “New directions in cryptogra-
phy,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 22, no. 6,
pp. 644–654, 1976.
[13] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, “Amethod for obtain-
ing digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems,” Commu-
nications of the ACM, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 120–126, 1978.
[14] N. Koblitz, “Elliptic curve cryptosystems,” Mathematics of
Computation, vol. 48, no. 177, pp. 203–209, 1987.
[15] V. Miller, “Uses of elliptic curves in cryptography,” in Advances
in Cryptology (Crypto ’85), H. C.Williams, Ed., vol. 218 of Lec-
ture Notes in Computer Scienc, pp. 417–426, Springer, Berlin,
Germany, 1986.
[16] IEEE P1363-2000, “Standard Specifications for Public Key
Cryptography,” http://standards.ieee.org/catalog/olis/busarch
.html.
[17] T. Miehling, B. Kuhls, H. Kober, H. Chodura, and M. Heit-
mann, “Security module specification,” Tech. Rep., HIS-
Herstellerinitiative Software, Bochum, Germany, July 2006,
Version 1.1.
[18] IEEE 1609.2-2006, “Trial-Use Standard for Wireless Access
in Vehicular Environments—Security Services for Applica-
tions and Management Messages,” http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/
servlet/opac?punumber=11000.
[19] R. Rivest, “RFC 1321: the MD5 message-digest algorithm,”
April 1992, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt.
[20] National Institute of Standards & Technology, “FIPS-180-2:
secure hash standard (SHS),” August 2002.
[21] U.S. Department of State, International traﬃc in arms regula-
tions (ITAR), code of federal regulations, title 22, parts 120–
130.
[22] P. van Oorschot, “Revisiting software protection,” in Proceed-
ings of the 6th International Conference on Information Security
(ISC ’03), vol. 2851 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp.
1–13, Bristol, UK, October 2003.
[23] S. Amendola, “Improving automotive security by eval-
uation—from security health check to common criteria,”
Tech. Rep., Security Research & Consulting GmbH, Bochum,
Germany, 2004.
[24] A. Weimerskirch, C. Paar, and M. Wolf, “Cryptographic com-
ponent identification: enabler for secure vehicles,” in Pro-
ceedings of the 62nd IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference
(VTC ’05), pp. 1227–1231, Dallas, Tex, USA, September 2005.
[25] C. Linn and S. Debray, “Obfuscation of executable code to
improve resistance to static disassembly,” in Proceedings of the
10th ACMConference on Computer and Communications Secu-
rity (CCS ’03), pp. 290–299, Washington, DC, USA, October
2003.
[26] C. S. Collberg and C. Thomborson, “Watermarking, tamper-
proofing, and obfuscation—tools for software protection,”
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, vol. 28, no. 8, pp.
735–746, 2002.
[27] J.-P. Hubaux, S. Cˇapkun, and J. Luo, “The security and privacy
of smart vehicles,” IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine, vol. 2,
no. 3, pp. 49–55, 2004.
[28] M. Wolf, A. Weimerskirch, and C. Paar, “Security in automo-
tive bus systems,” in Proceedings of Embedded Security in Cars
Workshop (ESCAR ’04), Bochum, Germany, November 2004.
[29] Car-2-Car Communication Consortium. http://www.car-2-
car.org/.
[30] Network on Wheels, http://www.network-on-wheels.de/.
[31] CVIS—Cooperative Vehicle-Infrastructure Systems. http://
www.cvisproject.org/.
[32] Safespot, Cooperative vehicles and road infrastructure for
road safety, http://www.safespot-eu.org/.
[33] K. Lemke, A.-R. Sadeghi, and C. Stu¨ble, “An open approach
for designing secure electronic immobilizers,” in Proceedings of
the 1st International Conference on Information Security Prac-
tice and Experience (ISPEC ’05), pp. 230–242, Singapore, April
2005.
[34] S. Cˇapkun and J.-P. Hubaux, “Secure positioning of wireless
devices with application to sensor networks,” in Proceedings
of the 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and
Communications Societies (INFOCOM ’05), vol. 3, pp. 1917–
1928, Miami, Fla, USA, March 2005.
[35] European Commission. EU NO 1360/2002, June 2002, Cor-
rigendum to commission regulation adapting for the sev-
enth time to technical progress council regulation (EEC) no
3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport.
[36] Gieschen Consultancy, Report: IP theft up 22%, massive $3
trillion counterfeits, May 2005, http://www.bascap.com/.
[37] R. J. Anderson, “On the security of digital tachographs,”
in Proceedings of the 5th European Symposium on Research
in Computer Security (ESORICS ’98), pp. 111–125, Springer,
Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, September 1998.
[38] S. Ross, “Parts counterfeiting,” October 2004, http://www.aft-
ermarketbusiness.com/aftermarketbusiness/article/articleDe-
tail.jsp?id=125346.
[39] eCall Driving Group, http://ec.europa.eu/information society/
activities/esafety/forum/ecall/index en.htm.
[40] Siemens VDO, Traﬃc sign recognition. http://www.siem-
ensvdo.com/products solutions/cars/propilot/.
